Vernon Vt dam high voltage electrical substation.
Posted in the Brattleboro Forum
#1 Sep 11, 2009
Vernon Vt dam high voltage electrical substation.
I am going to get pictures of the Vernon dam electrical substation soon. I am really concerned if the see me in the vicinity of Vermont Yankee taking picture of the dams electrical substation. Would that raise the back of all of our hairs.
If you want to get a taste of the conditions of electrical system, our power producing and grid and electrical distribution system...you need to get a look at this disgusting severely paint chipping and rusting hulk...the structure holding up the breakers, lines and transformers. It is a accident waiting to happen...a tree failing on a line or a wind storm...heavy wet snow of or a big ice storm...it could probable knock it over and collapse this substation. The question is, what does this disgusting looking rust and bubbling over paint...does it represent a loss of reliability of the dams electricity. There is no paint left on this low carbon steel structure...enormously susceptible to rust and steel oxidation.
Is the dam INOP as far as supplying emergency electrical power to Vermont Yankees safety buses. Could the INOPd dam force VY to enter a technical specification limitation?
Wouldnt that be a novel 2.206? It could get the industry to start worrying about their off site emergency power supplied to their units.
#2 Sep 11, 2009
The substation is 20 feet from the road and you can see everything clear as anything.
#3 Sep 11, 2009
I dont know what is a bigger risk to Vermont Yankee, all those nice new cars and pickups trucks parked in the Port Hole bar right across the street from the VY entrance after 4pm...or the rusting electrical sub station across the street for the bar?
#4 Sep 11, 2009
or the rusting electrical sub station across the street from the bar?
#5 Sep 11, 2009
Seeing what I saw...I could say the dams QA is completely broken down!
#6 Sep 11, 2009
You snap the pic and I will hold your big shoes and red nose.
#7 Sep 11, 2009
If I was a conscientious Entergy employee I would have to call the dam INOP?
#8 Sep 11, 2009
The damn supplying power is not part of Tech Specs. If I didn't know better I would think that you never worked there. Blackout backup power was never required to be part of tech specs or the FSAR.
#9 Sep 11, 2009
When I worked at Vermont Yankee effectively the dam and Vermont Yankee were a single organization...CVPS own us both. Now you got some sloppy foreigner who doesnt give a wit about the USA and our region running the Vernon dam...Transcanada.
It was interesting when I went by the dam at night one of the turbines was running with a screaming bearing.
#10 Sep 11, 2009
What is this crap said in 1997.
In Reference (b), Vermont Yankee requested an exemption from 1OCFR50, Appendix R, section l1I.L to allow use of the Vernon Tie as a source of ac power in alternative shutdown scenarios. Vermont Yankee utilizes alternative shutdown capability in the event of a fire in the control room or cable spreading room. Currently, Vermont Yankee uses one of the two onsite emergency diesel generators in an alternate shutdown mode as a source of ac power when offsite power is not available in the event of a control room or cable spreading room fire. This exemption was requested to facilitate the restoration of ac power to safe shutdown equipment and to reduce the operator timeline for initiating alternate shutdown systems. Use of the Vernon Tie has several significant advantages over use of an emergency diesel generator to meet alternate shutdown requirements. These advantages include: prompt restoration of power using simpler operator actions; continuous operation without dependence on support systems; and reliability of the Vernon Tie. As stated in Reference (b), the Vernon Tie is normally energized and the availability of Vernon Station has historically been well above 99%, exceeding the required alternate ac source availability of 95%. However, in the event the Vernon Tie is unavailable, a diesel generator will be available to provide backup powe
In Reference (b) Vermont Yankee stated that it would institute the following administrative limit in the event of an unplanned unavailability of the Vernon Tie: Power operation may continue for no more than 15 days, unless the Vernon Tie is returned to service or a Basis for Maintaining Operability (BMO) evaluation is written and approve
Power operation may continue for no more than 15 days, unless the Vernon Tie is, returned to service or a Basis for Maintaining Operability,(BMO) evaluation is written and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee. If the Vernon Tie cannot be returned to service within 15 days, submit a report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in accordance with IOCFR50. 4, within the next 24 hours outlining the reason for the unavailability, corrective actions being taken to restore the Vernon Tie, compensatory actions in place to provide ac power for Appendix R alternative shutdown fire scenarios and the time required
to make the Vernon Tie available.
From: "Hamer, Mike" <[email protected]>
To: "Jonathan Rowley" <[email protected]>
Date: 06/07/2007 3:43:08 PM
Subject: Vernon Tie info
Attached is a previously docketed letter that provides our commitment for LCO actions/notifications upon loss of the Vernon Tie line. Also attached is the procedure that contains a protected step to ensure this commitment is properly administered - see page 8.step 16.
<<BVY 97-25 - Vernon Tie - Appendix R Compliance Letter.tif>>
<<OP 2142 Vernon Tie lco.pdf>>
#11 Sep 11, 2009
Translation, we dont have the right equipment on site to quickly and with minimal operator actions, not enough employees on site to perform the emergency actions...so give us permission to use the electricity from Vernon tie and dam which does not have near the quality assurance at a nuclear rated diesel generators.
Our diesel generator have adequate quality...but they are to dam slow to startup in a emergency.
#12 Sep 11, 2009
Basically since the worst accident in the plants history...the one I predicted a year before it occurred....VY tripped all their breakers in the switchyard and depended on their diesel generator, they had inadequate cooling water supplied to them during this accident. So the outcome was to take a look at the adequacy of the Vernon Tie. I also made a complaint during this about our inability to perform the procedures during a fire in the switchgear room that caused us to abandon the control room and shutdown the plant remotely. This caused them to completely revamp the procedures, where because of inadequate components they came up with using the Vernon tie to juice up one side of the electric bus.
So the value of the tie has been increased. There has been inadequacies with demonstrating the operational quality with the Vernon tie since 1994...VY has been rope-a-doping the NRC with not completely correcting these inadequacies and dragging it out for decades since then. The NRC is saying to VY hit me some more and make us dizzy, so we wont make you fix these deficiencies and make you spend money to fix them.
#13 Sep 11, 2009
The state nuclear engineer came out saying they always could have used the Vernon tie with the worst case...he was responding to my leaked newspaper story saying the accident was a lot worst than admitted becasue the diesels didn't have adiquate water to them during the nuclear emergency, and dont forget I predicted this story a year prior.
I came back saying the nuclear licensed operators thought the Vernon tie as a system was a complete illusion and falsification, you cant depend on a electrical source that doesnt have the quality as a diesel generator...what are all you people nuts.
At the time that was going on there was absolutely no testing of the tie to see if it worked...this was abhorrent to a nuclear operator to depend on a electrical source in a accident with so little quality assurance....it was one of our many illusory safety systems on site that was only meant for public consumption...these systems had no real use...they were a mirage to tickle the public imagination with falsehoods!!!
#14 Sep 12, 2009
Can you even began to imagine the world we would be in if VY had to abandon the control room because of smoke and the all the instrumentation and controls were going nuts? Can you imagine how the media and newspaper would play this out...can you imagine the public declaration of the plant executives, the NRC and state officials? In this environment that would be the end of VY. The main media would pick it up...scrutiny would just be injected into the operation of Vermont Yankee.
Like how many times have the employees in a quick fashion had to isolate a emergency bus and connect the Vernon tie to a emergency bus. Yea they play computer mock games in Brattleboro. They did it in a outage once or twice, now they test it every 6 years...you got thousands components that are rarely operated that have to work perfectly in a dire nuclear emergency. A nuclear plant is so vulnerable at this point, all her plant protections and design have been striped from her...
#15 Sep 12, 2009
The unconscionable national nuclear philosophy we have created, the infrequent and high consequence accident we get in, as we keep going down that pike heading into larger infrequency and larger potential consequences, we accept less quality of the components and the operator skill levels. As we go down the pike of ever increasing consequences one component failure or employee error exponentially increases the risk of a bad outcome with the accident. One error with normally operating plant and everything in good shape the consequences of that is insignificant, one error with a fire in the switchgear room with the old girl naked and trembling, this causes a enormous increase in damage to the plant and increasing risk to the community. You cant afford errors when you abandon the control and have to use the Vernon tie.
The higher the potential consequence if the accident, as you go down the road we have the less quality and assurance with having a safety system that will work. I always figured it went the other way, the higher the potential consequences of a action, the higher the quality we build in the safety system that are left standing and functional.
So the safety systems we depend on in a infrequent accident should have more quality than a frequent accident, which the plant is fully designed and accommodated for?
#16 Sep 12, 2009
As a example, the worst the accident is at the plant the more blinded a license operator becomes...the more he doesnt know. When he is flipping the switch in a dire nuclear emergency to connect up the Vernon tie to the VY emergency bus...he doesnt have the mental picture in his mind, he cant see the corroded substation, he cant anticipate, think one step ahead, is it a high quality of electricity or do I have to worry that it is a low quality electricity, am I going to waste my precious seconds on this system that might fail. Seconds at this point is extremely valuable.
Now with a licensed operator experienced with training on the simulator, if the Vernon dam was his property and he was eying the quality of the electricity, seen the severely corroded substation and poor maintenance practices, she could imagine the consequence of a error or component breakdown if she had to depend on the Vernon tie. She'd know at this stage of the game public risk is fault intolerant.
She would think I got to protect myself, never allow me to get so deep in having a error that cost so much...she would engage the corporation or NRC into fixing the quality of the power supplied in a emergency.
Do you see how startling blind VY is to the condition of the Vernon station is in...do you see how blind we become going down the pike of consiquance actions?
#17 Sep 12, 2009
I mean that is where risk perspective gets you, the more consequence accident or consequence action necessary, the more permission they give us to have less quality with the safety component we use.
#18 Sep 12, 2009
It was a typical self inflected wound...they shot themselves in the foot, the operation of Vermont Yankee get really sloppy in the early 1990s...they werent spending money on the plant...the cut backs caused poor employee skills and lots of component breakdowns in a plant trip. The result is the switchyard went belly up...they couldnt supply the grid and the grid couldnt supply them, they only depended on both diesel generator to supply power to the site. Then the dg were inadequately supplied with cooling water.
If VY never got sloppy and caused this accident...put the image that there was a threat to the normal electricity to a nuclear power plant...there would never be any questioning of the adequacy to the Vernon tie.
They has been a money spent in investigating, inspection reports and studying the Vernon ties...wonder how much money was spent on these reports? For some reason VY and the industry like hiring contractors and creating reports...they dont like to much add new equipment to the plant. It certainly keeps the contractors and the report people in jobs, but it doesnt solve problems.
Why not stick a additional 4 megawatt diesel generator attached to the Vernon Line on VY property. Think of the mind numbing complexity going on here...Velco and the NE ISO operates the big breakers that has to facilitates providing juice to VY, at times the Vernon Station isnt even manned, they remotely operate the breakers from Holyoke or something. See the complexity and the loss of visibility going across a host of different organization...a addition diesel would be a lot more reliable than this monstrosity.
I am confused with the Vernon dam not being manned, with the TransCanada employees being given two hours to show up at the Vernon station...with VY needing to connect emergency power within 10 minutes to a nuclear safety bus. Does the glove fit?
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1 min ago
All bet are off if there was intentional errors going on here...if it turns into a falsification.
It would turn from a innocent and inadvertent transparency error, into one of falsifying the quality of a emergency power supply to a nuclear power plant.
#19 Sep 13, 2009
Sheldon, maybe you should actually get your NRC license before posting here anymore. It might keep from looking like an idiot.
#20 Sep 13, 2009
I dont like the idea of agreements, say between the ISO or even TransCanda...because there is no severe sanctions commiserate with the potential damage that may occur if the terms of the agreement arent met.
They are powerless agreements.
What I dont like at the end of the day with the Vernon dam is VY and the NRC have absolutely no control of the electricity supplied in a emergency.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station
License No. DPR-28 (Docket No. 50-271)
Response to Generic Letter 2006-02, Grid Reliability and
the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power
I suppose they are assuming if it is a plant centric LOOP or a grid centric LOOP....but they did have a LOOP within the last 20 years where they did lose immediate delayed access, went past the boundaries of GDC 17.
I consider this answer as dishonest.
5c.....No. Based on the limited number of LOOP occurrences in the ISO-NE region over the past 10 years no seasonal variation can be established. During the last twenty years, VY has not experienced the loss of both the immediate access and the delayed access sources.
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