The F-22 is a pile of junk. Too expensive. Such a failure, only 195 were built and it's been replaced by the junkier and even more expensive F-35 which, after years of "development", is unflyable and could be shot down by a Sopwith Camel. Consider (F22):
Delays, technical glitches and huge cost overruns in the Air Force's F-22 fighter jet program highlight the Pentagon's broken procurement process.
By Ralph Vartabedian and W.J. Hennigan Los Angeles Times
June 16, 2013
When the U.S. sought to assure Asian allies that it would defend them against potential aggression by North Korea this spring, the Pentagon deployed its top-of-the-line jet fighter, the F-22 Raptor.
But only two of the jets were sent screaming through the skies south of Seoul.
That token show of American force was a stark reminder that the U.S. may have few F-22s to spare. Alarmed by soaring costs, the Defense Department shut down production last year after spending $67.3 billion on just 188 planes — leaving the Air Force to rely mainly on its fleet of 30-year-old conventional fighters.
"People around the world aren't dumb," said House Armed Services Committee Chairman Howard "Buck" McKeon (R-Santa Clarita). "They see what we have. They recognize that our forces have been severely depleted."
Lockheed Martin Corp.'s F-22 is the most lethal fighter jet in the world. But it has also become a symbol of a broken procurement process that's failing to deliver advanced weapons systems on time, on budget and in sufficient quantities.
The F-22 was originally intended to replace all of the Air Force's F-15 combat jets that date back to the early 1970s. But today those F-15s still represent the bulk of a so-called air superiority fleet — the jets that are supposed to outgun enemy aircraft and gain control of the sky.
Nonetheless, the F-22 program cemented Lockheed's position as the premier manufacturer of combat aircraft in the world.
The system is totally broken and everybody knows it"
— Sherman Mullin, retired former Lockheed F-22 program chief
The early cancellation led directly to a new advanced warplane, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter that Lockheed also produces. Today, that nearly $400-billion system is headed in the same direction as the F-22, falling behind schedule, encountering serious software problems and suffering sharp cost growth.
ambitious programs based on low-ball estimates by contractors, critics say. Eager to speed money to their home states, members of Congress allocate funding for these leading-edge defense programs, even before the technologies are developed and tested.
"If everybody involved would be more realistic and didn't lie about risk, technical difficulty and cost, we wouldn't have these problems," said Thomas P. Christie, a retired official who spent nearly 50 years working in Pentagon acquisitions. "We jump into these decisions, then get surprised about the outcome."
The F-22 experienced almost every one of these problems. The Air Force began laying plans to build the F-22 in the early 1980s. A decade later, it estimated it would take nine years and $12.6 billion to develop the jet, but it ended up taking 19 years and costing $26.3 billion, not including the production of any aircraft. By the time production was completed, the F-22 cost an average of $412 million each, up from the original estimate of $149 million.
"The system is totally broken and everybody knows it," said Sherman Mullin, the retired former Lockheed chief of the F-22 program and a fierce advocate for the jet. "Partially, the F-22 fell victim to that."